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Directors, boards and the companies they endeavour to lead face a variety of risks. They range from natural 
disasters that might be infrequent and difficult to predict, to errors, mistakes and unintended consequences 
which may occur on a regular basis, and movements in currency rates which may be in a continual state of 
flux. Some risks are newer than others and older risks may now be caused in new ways. Directors should not 
assume that risk management is effective (Hubbard, 2009). 
 
A degree of risk can be healthy and viewed as an indication of life in a market economy. While innovation 
and entrepreneurship can both be desirable they may increase risk (Brockhaus,1980). Traditionally, it has 
been assumed that risk and return have been related (Modigliani and Miller, 1958), but applications of 
performance support may enable returns to be increased and risks reduced or contained (Coulson-Thomas, 
2012a & b, 2013).  
 
One almost universal and traditional area of risk which is ever present in many situations, contexts and 
locations is fraud. It is now being perpetrated on an industrial basis, as criminals and others take advantage 
of technological and other developments. For example, the internet of things and larger numbers of 
connected devices have created a new frontier of opportunity for criminals. Many directors should devote 
more attention to fraud, cyber-fraud and other cyber crimes such as hacking. 
 
THE COUNTER-FRAUD CHALLENGE 
 
 
Fraud is a form of theft by lying. It is a crime and one that is significantly under reported. Many of those who 
suffer losses feel ashamed and embarrassed. People and organisations rarely want to reveal that they are 
victims. They may also believe that the prospect of recovering money that has been taken is low.  They 
quietly take a hit. Much of the criminal eco-system feeds upon large numbers of small strikes. These losses 
suffered by many people can add up to a large amount. In some countries, the majority of businesses have 
suffered effective malware attacks of some form.  
 
An even higher proportion of small businesses are likely to have been victims of malware and other cyber 
attacks. The cost of preventative and protective measures can represent a bigger proportionate burden for a 
smaller enterprise. They are also less likely to maintain the critical mass of qualified staff needed for greater 
resistance and resilience. In the equivalent of an arms race between criminal and potential victims, many 
companies do not have the resources, discipline or single minded focus to win. The openness and informality 
they cherish can also make them vulnerable. 
 
Governance structures and corporate processes and systems tend to follow a pattern or blueprint. They are 
often rule and logic based. They are designed to cope with defined categories and particular situations. To a 
fraudster or hacker they may be predictable. In order to reduce cost and variation corporate systems and 
processes often rely upon classification, standardisation and automation. The people who operate them may 
be given little discretion to change responses to meet the particular requirements of individual callers or 
customers. 
 
In contrast, criminals can be more flexible. While corporate staff are busy, distracted and under pressure, 
fraudsters can plot and scheme. They can try different options and modify their approaches to exploit 
loopholes or home in on what they perceive as an area of vulnerability. If they smell blood they can persist. 
The issue for them is not completing all transactions, but succeeding in enough of their attempted frauds to 
cover their operating costs. Like gamblers, they operate in a world of probabilities. To combat them one 
needs to understand their motivations and perspective and their view of opportunities and vulnerabilities 
(Hussain, 2014). 
 
Businesses recognise the distinction between structured activity to cope with most eventualities and 
occasional chance events, where insurance may be a better option than relatively high expenditure on 
attempts to prevent an incident with a low probability of occurrence. It may make sense to pay a regular 
premium and raise a claim as and when a risk materialises. However, in the case of some forms of crime 
such as cyber-crime, insurance may be difficult to obtain at an affordable price. 
 
PATTERNS OF FRAUD 
 
 
Although new approaches to enticing desired responses and overcoming defences are continually being 
tried, some attempts at fraud follow certain patterns. For example, different phishing attacks may have 
features in common. Making people aware of these may alert them to those emails which might be suspect. 
Many fraudsters only need a very small proportion of recipients to click upon an attachment, or to respond 
with password information, in order to cover their costs.  
 
Criminals who carry out cyber attacks are becoming more focused and determined. Greater effort may now 
be devoted to preparation and learning about a target business prior to launching a planned attack to steal 
larger amounts of money or data. Once entry is secured via a business email account, some time may be 
spent in various forms of scouting. Fraudsters or hackers may aim to assess criminal possibilities without 
alerting a potential victim. Stolen data, code and entry and other tools and techniques can all be purchased 
and exchanged on dark forums. Many criminals have built up well equipped operations that are either as 
sophisticated as those of most of their targets, or are more so.  
 
The nature of mutating cyber threats is such that it is difficult for many individual companies to keep their 
defences current and to cope without help from others (Coulson-Thomas, 2016). Obtaining and developing 
the skills required to operate adequate defences is not easy. There is also a risk that some of those who are 
trained might themselves go on to become hackers. Defences may need to be continually changed and 
updated if they are to remain secure. In doing this many companies may have to play catch up in response 
to new forms of attack. 
 
Companies should continually scan for threats and monitor trends and developments in the threat landscape 
in order to identify and scope potential problems. A company needs to be able to quickly distinguish between 
problems it feels it can deal with itself and those which will require external assistance and/or collaboration if 
they are to be addressed or guarded against. Criteria may need to be set for determining which risks or 
intrusions would warrant disclosure and collaboration with law enforcement agencies. Encouraging people to 
read about a fictional corporate fraud situation could be a further way of alerting people to risks and practical 
counter-measures (Pickett, 2007). 
 
COST-EFFECTIVENESS CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 
More sophisticated criminals monitor the cost-effectiveness of their operations. Like entrepreneurs, they think 
in terms of probabilities, risks and returns. With more opportunities to monetise what is taken, returns from 
cyber-crimes such as data theft may be increasing (Coulson-Thomas, 2016). 
 
Measures and responses that increase the risks faced by criminals, lower their returns, reduce the probability 
of a successful strike and raise the prospects of being tracked and closed down or caught may cause them 
to pause. They may give up if continuing does not seem worthwhile. Effective individual and collective action 
by companies, regulators and other agencies can deter attacks and cause criminals to switch their attention 
to softer targets.   
 
Counter-fraud activities and agencies also have to cover their costs. They may need to show value for 
money. In judging performance, one should add the cost and disruption caused by preventative and counter 
measures to any financial losses suffered. Potential opportunities that might have been missed due to a loss 
of trust, following awareness of one or more incidents of fraud, can be difficult to assess. Many companies 
do not report fraud because of concerns that knowledge of them might reduce the confidence that prospects 
and customers and other stakeholders have in them. 
 
The sharing of information about different forms of attack and how best to address them can be very 
beneficial for tackling certain forms of fraud, especially cyber crimes. Directors may be concerned to protect 
intellectual property and commercially sensitive information during this process, but these may be more at 
risk as a result of a reluctance and failure to cooperate, where this results in insufficient information to assess 
the true nature of what is happening across a market or sector. Inadequate knowledge of a situation 
complicates prioritisation and the planning of responses.   
 
Companies are often less worried about small financial losses than they would be about a major leak of 
personal or corporate data. However, a small loss to a fraudster who operates on the basis of making lots of 
small strikes due to a lack of vigilance on the part of some people could reveal a systemic weakness. This 
might be exploited by another criminal intent upon making a smaller number of much larger gains. The 
possible consequences of all breaches and deficiencies should be carefully considered. Small tremors can 
be harbingers of major quakes. 
 
CORPORATE EXPOSURE AND RESPONSES 
 
 
Companies need to be alert to where they and their people are vulnerable. Often the easiest way into an 
organisation's systems and data is via a naïve and/or slack employee who leaves a door open or 
inadvertently admits a criminal to a corporate network. After entering by a back door the criminal can move 
around to the equivalent of the “front of the house where valuables are stored”. The full range of 
communications are at risk, as large numbers of people regularly become victims of email, text, postal and 
telephone scams. A scam occurs when a victim authorises payment, which may not be the case with fraud, 
but like fraud a scam is a category of criminal behaviour.  
 
Persistent scam callers set out to build trust. A proportion of those approached usually reveal details of their 
passwords. Anti-fraud newsletters and other communications can be used to alert people to the 
consequences of becoming a victim and the risks of compromising the security of corporate systems. Basic 
guidance should not be overlooked. Many people put images and details of their activities, movements, 
homes and offices on social media. Such disclosure gives criminals a mass of information, including notice of 
when they are away.  
 
People should be encouraged to be vigilant in relation to their own actions and what is going on around 
them. They should be on the look out for tell-tale signs that someone might be lying (Houston et al, 2013). 
When in doubt or concerned, they should be encouraged to alert those responsible for corporate and 
network security. Confidential reporting arrangements and help lines may be both welcomed and used by 
those with concerns. An effective whistleblowing policy can also enable more cases of fraud to be identified 
(ACCA, 2016), but people may need to be reassured they will not suffer adverse consequences if they speak 
up (Alford, 2001). 
 
Manufacturers should consider ways of preventing the misuse of any of their products that are connected to 
the internet. Developers of corporate software need to be aware of security issues. In many countries, there 
are various sources of information and intelligence that companies can turn to, and public and other services 
they can access, to better protect themselves. Care needs to be taken to ensure that corporate policies to 
reduce various risks do not inhibit innovation and responsible risk taking. 
 
COLLABORATION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION  
 
 
Directors should be wary of complacency. Being watertight yesterday does not mean one's company will 
survive tomorrow's attack. The digital landscape and threats within is are continually changing and evolving. 
An report from ACCA (2013) suggests that digital technologies and their applications are evolving more 
rapidly than individuals and organisations can adapt and put in place ways of protecting themselves from 
their misuse. Many companies are struggling to cope and more collaborative action is needed from sharing 
information to international action.   
 
In some cases, the most useful actual or potential anti-fraud collaborators are equivalent organisations 
and/or agencies in similar situations in other countries, rather than local companies in one's home country. 
For example, anti-fraud agencies in cities that are major financial centres may find they have much in 
common in terms of the challenges they face and who they are up against. It makes sense for them and 
similar companies in certain sectors to cooperate whether by exchanges of staff, joint working on 
preventative measures or addressing particular threats. 
 
There are many forms of cooperation which may or may not be acceptable, depending upon the terms and 
arrangements of each collaboration framework. The latter may specify formats in which data, insights and 
experiences will need to be captured, stored and transmitted if it is to be effectively shared. Paradoxically, 
the separation of data in terms of storage and access, and the use of different programmes and devices to 
limit access for hackers who breach outer defences, can make data, information and knowledge more 
difficult to assemble and share. Collective and international action through trade associations and other 
sectoral bodies can also be helpful. 
 
As well as yielding benefits, collaboration can involve risk. Apart from the risk of a sharing network itself 
being compromised, there is the possibility of becoming swamped and distracted by an excess of 
information, some of which might not be relevant to the problems faced by a receiving company. Also, law 
enforcement agencies do not have unlimited resources. They cannot follow every possible lead. Hence the 
need for selectivity and focus. Areas to concentrate upon are where there are known vulnerabilities, the 
consequences of penetration and theft could be serious, and recovery and/or compensation costs would be 
high.  
 
COMPANIES AS OBSTACLES 
 
 
Some directors put too much faith in corporate defences. They may feel that a company can cope on its own. 
The risk of fraud, hacking and failure is sometimes greatest when senior people are at their most confident 
and others defer to them and go along for the ride on account of their apparent and past success. Hubris can 
lead to unfortunate and serious consequences (Nixon, 2016). 
 
From the perspective of law enforcement agencies companies can sometimes be obstacles rather than allies 
in their attempts to track down and catch criminals. For example, when companies take steps to protect their 
customers' communications and devices from state surveillance agencies this can create new opportunities 
for criminals. Law enforcement agencies may no longer be able to monitor the planned and ongoing 
activities of suspects and accumulate the evidence that would bring them to justice. Certain devices cannot 
be opened even when court orders have been obtained. 
 
Most directors will instinctively want to protect a company's customers. Many of them might wish to shield 
customers and users from a snooping Government. Hence the use of shields, encryption and the design of 
products such as mobile communications devices with high levels of security for informed users. Directors 
may have to balance the desire of their customers for privacy, encryption and secure devices against the risk 
that a proportion of users may be using their company's public networks and devices for criminal purposes to 
the detriment of other customers they seek to protect.  
 
Vocal lobbies put the case for freedom from surveillance. They stress the risk that giving greater powers to 
state authorities could lead to their abuse. Certain adoptions of technological developments, such as the 
greater use of Blockchain applications which record each step in a process, could create audit trails that 
might allow liability to be established, for example in relation to a claim of mis-selling. The same sort of 
evidence could help to bring external parties to justice. 
 
Certain Governments sponsor illegal attempts to secure intellectual property and other valuable information. 
Some companies that are sensitive to external surveillance by state authorities may themselves use various 
espionage techniques, such as eavesdropping on their commercial rivals. They may seek advice on how to 
obtain information about their competitors on a systematic basis (Carleson, 2013). Companies in sectors 
such as defence and aerospace may be particularly at risk. They should take steps to help their staff resist 
attempts by others to obtain information from them. 
 
As already mentioned, the internet of things is creating new areas of vulnerability that need addressing. 
Many customers do not change the default passwords used by manufacturers and suppliers, thus allowing 
unauthorised access to connected products and devices. External control of ones fridge might be 
inconvenient, but unauthorised control of ones car could be life threatening. New and potentially expensive 
areas of corporate liability could be established.  
 
PROBABILITY AND PRIORITISATION  
 
 
When and where collaboration occurs, and access to data and communications is obtained by state 
authorities, there may be other bridges to cross. Although large numbers of frauds may be regularly 
happening, these can represent a small proportion of an enormous volume of financial transactions that are 
occurring on a daily basis. Given the inconvenience that can be caused by blocking transactions, not to 
mention the protests and damages claims that could result, fraud monitoring activity has to focus upon a 
small minority of them that appear unusual and/or suspect. It has to do this in a way that does not impose 
disproportionate cost and inconvenience upon the great majority of users of various services.  
 
The volume of transactions that is occurring, and the number of messages being sent, are such that without 
intelligent filtering and monitoring, both preventative systems and people may be swamped. Search criteria 
need to be established, according to the prioritisation of risks, the availability of technical solutions and 
whether or not particular targets or threats have been identified. For most companies, a high priority should 
be put upon protecting customers. Extra vigilance may be required when major and IT projects are involved 
(Flyvbjerg, 2003, Flyvbjerg and Budzier, 2011).  
 
Some threats with particularly low probabilities of occurrence can have the largest impacts if and when they 
succeed. An example would be a planned terrorist attack designed to inflict the maximum of damage and 
disruption. Simultaneous action against a number of leading banks could be designed to bring down a 
banking and financial system. The consequences could be severe and widely felt. They could include a 
break down of law and order. Many companies could only operate for a limited time without access to credit 
and/or an inflow of cash, while unrest might occur quickly among unpaid citizens. 
 
NEW AREAS OF CONTROL 
 
 
Governments, companies and other organisations need to be alert to new areas in which controls might be 
required. Some of these may be in traditional arenas. Law enforcement agencies could seek additional 
powers to access private data and track suspects, while companies might, as already mentioned, resist and 
seek to protect their customers from unwanted intrusion and interference. Controls may be needed in fields 
that are opening up. For example, what if any controls and conditions should be placed upon the “things” that 
are connected to the internet of things? How should such connections be protected? Should they be 
monitored and for what purposes? 
 
There is a risk that digital skills training could equip future hackers to cause harm. Should companies be 
more circumspect in terms of who receives certain forms of exposure to advanced tools and techniques? 
Should digital skills development be accompanied by ethical awareness training? What are the best tests 
and checks to use when selecting people for cyber security roles and related development activities? Should 
greater use be made of biometrics in identity checks, such as those for securing access to sensitive areas? 
 
Thought needs to be given to the allocation of roles and responsibilities for dealing with fraud and other risks. 
Internal and external auditors have a responsibility for assessing processes and internal controls, but what 
about supply chain and other external networks? A chief financial officer and his or her team will have a 
particular interest in preventing financial fraud. Chief security, information and knowledge officers will be 
keen to protect corporate data, information and know-how. The HR director and team should be alert to the 
human factors that can result in people who have hitherto been trusted engaging in fraudulent activities 
(Hussain, 2014). To what extent should they and others have a remit to protect the interests of stakeholders 
and wider society from illicit activities? 
 
WIDER CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
 
The social responsibility of business has long been an issue (Bowen, 1953). Some boards have a narrow 
and largely internal focus when matters of security and fraud are concerned. Law enforcement agencies are 
involved as a last resort, as and when needed. Should boards just focus upon minimising harm to the entities 
for which they are responsible, or should they acknowledge wider corporate social responsibilities? For 
example, should they prevent future harm to fellow citizens and external parties by collaborating with other 
organisations and relevant agencies and authorities in the building of collective defences and the tracking 
down of fraudsters and hackers? 
 
Sometimes it might appear that the easiest option is to look the other way and just focus upon one's core 
business, but is this always the right course of action? Data lost in seconds might result in consequences 
that may take individual victims of a crime such as identity fraud many days to address. In such situations, a 
company might have to act quickly to protect its customers. On other occasions, what is exposed to a hacker 
may be well backed up and of little value or danger to others if it is accessed and downloaded. In such 
circumstances, a well prepared company may have options, including an opportunity to hit back.  
 
Once an incident of hacking has been detected an instinctive reaction may be to “shut the door”. However, 
from a law enforcement perspective there might be merit in allowing a breach to continue long enough to 
enable a hacker or criminal source to be tracked. Should significant harm result from a delay in instituting 
counter measures, a decision not to close down quickly may well be criticised. Calculating probable costs 
and benefits in such circumstances may seem like sophistry, but should institutions facing large numbers of 
daily threats from hackers do more to collaborate in efforts to monitor, track and also respond to the major 
threats they face? In certain cases might there be a case for pro-active action where this is legal and 
appropriately authorised? 
 
THE ROLE OF BOARDS 
 
 
Corporate governance should strike the right balance between risk, compliance and performance (ACCA, 
2014). Cyber security and anti-fraud strategy and policies should be higher on some boardroom agendas. 
Many directors need to step up to their responsibilities in relation to fraud and other criminal activity that can 
have immediate and lasting consequences. They are also a threat to the market systems and societies within 
which companies operate. Directors have a duty to act in the long-term interests of the entities for which they 
are responsible.  
 
Boards should also balance costs and benefits and take the interests of stakeholders into account in their 
decision making. Expensive plans and arrangements based upon previous experience may fail to provide 
protection against new forms of attack. To what extent should resources be devoted to addressing unknown 
and unpredictable events (Sagarin, 2012)? Organic evolution of defences in the light of a changing risk and 
threat environment, flexibility, 24/7 monitoring and responding decisively and rapidly when frauds and hacks 
occur might be an affordable option.  
 
Additional checks, alerts, help, monitoring and reporting arrangements can be built into processes and 
support tools (Coulson-Thomas, 2012a & b, 2013). It is good business sense as well as a moral and social 
responsibility to collaborate to protect a company - and its supply chain and stakeholders - and to confront 
significant threats to future operations and sustainable development. Customers, suppliers, staff, associates, 
investors, business partners, public bodies and others can all be victims or potential victims of fraud and 
other criminal activities that are increasingly undertaken across national borders and on an international 
basis. 
 
Given the nature of the threats we all face, should we leave it to law enforcement agencies with limited 
budgets and manpower to act alone to stem the criminal tide? If companies and their boards do not take 
steps to protect themselves and their stakeholders, report and share information, and collaborate with 
regulators, law enforcement and other agencies, Governments may need to become more involved. They 
have a duty to protect their citizens, and like companies they face difficult choices. The measures they might 
introduce could involve extra bureaucracy, further costs and additional taxation. Some forms of Government 
action, such as introducing greater powers to snoop or intervene when vital services are interrupted may 
prove unpopular with many directors. 
 
So long as people are wedded to greater connectivity, the use of the internet for transactions and other 
activities, remote access, portable technology, e-government and other on-line services and flexible working 
and learning practices our vulnerability as individuals, communities and societies may continue to increase. If 
our way of life, markets and the capitalist system are to survive, directors and boards must play their part in 
corporate and collective efforts to protect them.   
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